Similarities between the theories of G.H. Mead and L.S. Vygotsky: An explanation? by Veer, R. van der
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE THEORIES OF G.H. HEAD
AND L.S. VYGOTSKIJ: AN EXPLANATION?
R. van der Veer,
University of Leiden
Summary
Several researchers have noted the striking similarities between
the philosophy of G.H. Mead (1863-1931) and the cultural-historical
theory developed by the Russian psychologist L.S. Vygotskij
(1896-1934). In this paper we present some of the similarities and
suggest that they have their origin in the writings of the German
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel.
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The writings of both Herbert Head and Lev Semenovic Vygotskij play
an important role in contemporary child psychology. Some
researchers (Kaye & Charney, 1980; Mundy-Castle, 1980) appealed to
Head's theory in order to explain the phenomena observed in
adult-child interaction. Other researchers (Wertsch, 1979, 1980;
Wood, 1980) tried to find a theoretical perspective in the work of
Vygotskij. Still other psychologists have tried to integrate both
theories. Lock (1980) in his book on language development based his
approach explicitly on both Vygotskij and Mead. He and others
(Lückmann, 1977; Wertsch & Stone, in press) have noted the striking
similarities between the ideas of the American social-behaviorist
and the Russian founder of the cultural-historical school. Un-
fortunately, until now on one has been able to offer a satisfying
explanation for this curious coincidence. We thus had to rely on
theories such as Herton's (1961) of multiple discoveries, or on the
ever present and highly etherial Zeitgeist. There seems to be,
however, a more matter-of-fact explanation possible. Both Mead and
Vygotsij made a thorough study of the philosophy of Georg W.F.
Hegel (1770-1831) and the common conceptions of their work can most
probably be tracked down to Hegel's writings. In order to show this
a short description of some of the common ideas in Head's and
- 2 -
Vygotskij's work will be presented. After that, the origin of these
similarities will be shown to be their common knowledge of
Hegel's philosophy.
Head
Most researchers in the field of adult-child interaction have been |
impressed by Mead's account of the origin of mind. Mead defended ,
the position that the human mind develops in the social interaction
with other people. Empiricist or rationalistic theories cannot give J
a sufficient account of cognitive and emotional child development. ƒ
In Hind, Self and Society Mead formulated his conception as fol- 1
lows : "
For if, as Wundt does, you presuppose the existence of mind
at the start ... then the origin of minds and the interaction
among minds become mysteries. But if, on the other hand, you
regard the social process of experience as prior (in a .
rudimentary form) to the existence of mind and explain the
origin of minds in terras of the interaction among individuals
within that process, then not only the origin of minds, but
also the interaction among minds... cease to seem mysterious
or miraculous. Mind arises through commun!rat i on by a
conversation of gestures in a social process or context of
experience - not communication through mind (Mead, 1934: 50).
In the same book Mead opposes to the 'prisoner in a cell'-approach,
in which the child is seen as a prisoner in a cell, who knows that
others are in a like position and wants to get in contact with them
(Mead, 1934: 6). This approach was unacceptable to Mead because it
presupposed an original, presocial mind. To account for the origin
of mind in ontogenenis Mead proposed his theory of the 'vocal
gestures'. Children are continually making gestures thereby
stimulating the surrounding adults. Adults interpret these gestures
as gestures and react accordingly. At a certain point in his or her
development the child realizes that his or her gestures have indeed
significance. As soon as that happens they have a meaning for the
child him/herself. In Mead's words, "the individual who is
stimulating others to respond is at the same time arousing in
himself the tendencies to the same reactions" (Mead, 1980: 187).
i
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Reasoning in this way Mead comes to the conclusion that the self
has appeared only in the social conduct of humans. It is just
because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the
others who are involved in his conduct that he or she mentally
develops (Mead, 1980: 184; 1982: 145).
Although Mead did not develop a very clear developmental
theory his ideas aroused recently much interest. One of the at-
tractive points of his theory is that it is an interactional
) theory, which does not reduce child development to either the
i processes of organic growth or to the changing factors in the
environment. Another reason for Mead's popularity is that he was
one of the first to highlight the 'counterfactual' character of
t child development. As several researchers have suggested, child
development is partly based on 'adultomorphism'. Adults interpret
the behavior of their children as if they were intentional. Kaye
and Charney (1980) note that, "across a good many studies of face-
', to-face play in the early months ... the rule seems to be that if
an infant gives his mother any behavior which can be interpreted as
if he has taken a turn in a conversation, it will be; if he does
not, she will pretend he has" (p. 227). Other researchers
(Trevarthen, 1980; Wood, 1980; Markovâ, 1982) have studied this
phenomenon and suggested that it plays an important role in onto-
genesis. Through the constant feedback in adult-child interaction
the child will eventually realize that his actions indeed have
meaning. This is supposed to be one of the most important factors
in the development of intentional behavior and consciousness (Mar-
kovâ, 1982: 153). We can thus clearly see why Mead's theory is
considered to be a source of inspiration in recent adult-child
interaction research.
Vygotskij
Other psychologists have turned to the writings of Vygotskij to
find a fruitful theoretical perspective. Most often one refers to
his notion of social interaction (obsenie). Vygotskij stated that
all higher psychological processes develop in social interaction.
More specifically, he stated that:
I
l
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Any function in the child's cultural development appears
twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane,
and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between
people as an interpsychological category, and then within the
child as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true
with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the forma-
tion of concepts and the development of volition (in Wertsch,
1981: 163).
As did Mead, Vygotskij opposed to a 'prisoner in a cell approach'.
In fact, this was one of his main criticisms of the early Piaget.
The child is not by nature a biological individual later to be
socialized under pressure from his or her environment, but far
sooner social by nature, developing through interactions with
adults (Van IJzendoorn & Van der Veer, 1984: 27).
To account for the origin of the higher psychological proces-
ses Vygotskij combined his notion of social interaction with the
idea of mediation. The idea was that psychological processes in
child development are transformed by making use of psychological
tools or signs. The most important system of signs is, of course,
speech. As soon as the child is able to communicate by signs his or
her psychological processes get a completely different (higher)
character. These notions have been clarified by Wertsch (1979,
1980), Van IJzendoorn and Van der Veer (1984) and we will not go
into any details now. What is important for this paper is that
Vygotskij made a suggestion for an explanation of preverbal adult-
child interaction as well. Before the child gets to the mastery of
the sign system (speech) a role is played by the indexical gesture.
In 1931 he formulated this idea like this:
Let us consider as an example the history of the development
of the indexical gesture, which as we will see, played an
extremely important role in the development of the child's
speech and in general forms to a considerable extent the
primordial basis of all higher forms of behavior. Initially
the indexical gesture is no more than an unsuccesful attempt
to grab at something. The gesture is oriented to the object
and the intended action. The child tries to catch the object,
which is too far away. His arms, stretched out to the object,
are hanging in the air, his fingers make indexical movements.
This is the starting situation for further development. Here
4
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for the first time develops the indexical movement, which we
conditionally may call an indexical gesture in itself. Here we
have a movement of the child, which is objectively directed at
the object, and no more than that. When the mother comes to
the aid of the child and interprets his movement as a gesture
the situation changes essentially. The indexical gesture now
becomes a gesture for others. In response to the unsuccesful
attempt to catch the object, there follows no reaction by the
object, but by another human. In that way the initial meaning
is brought by others into the unsuccesful movement. And only
afterwards, on the basis of the fact that the child connects
the unsuccesful attempt with the whole objective situation, he
or she starts to react to this movement as to an indexical
gesture ... The child is in this way the last to realize the
significance of his or her gesture ... In this way, one could
say, we become ourselves through others ... The meaning ...
first exists for others and only afterwards begins to exist
for the child him/herself" (in Vygotskij, 1983: 144-145).
It is clear that this conception of Vygotskij has great
similarities with Mead's theory. We recognize the role of the
gesture and the 'as if' (counterfactual) character of child
development. On top of that both authors have underlined the
originally social character of the child and rejected the 'prisoner
in a cell' view. There are more similarities between the writings
of Mead and Vygotskij , but for the purpose of this paper this will
do. We now have to explain these striking facts.
Hegel
We know that both Mead and Vygotskij studied Hegel's philosophy.
Vygotskij was much impressed by Hegel's work (see Levitin, 1982)
and frequently quoted his books. He was also influenced indirectly
by Hegel's philosophy, through the writings of Marx and Engels (see
Van IJzendoorn & Van der Veer, 1984: 35-39). One of the reasons
Vygotskij turned to philosophers such as Hegel and Spinoza, was his
being not satisfied with the Cartesian paradigm in psychology.
Vygotskij, and Soviet psychology in general, rejected a rigid
distinction between mind and body. In dialectical materialism mind
is considered to be a higher form or quality of matter (see
McLeish, 1975; Van der Veer, 1984).
The mind-body problem was, in fact, one of the reasons why
Mead turned to the philosophy of Hegel. Miller, in his introduction
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to Mead's The individual and the social self, states that Mead
rebelled against the theological claim that the mind (or the soul)
is a supernatural substance, that it can exist apart from the body,
"... his revolt against the belief in a spiritual self as a sub-
stance distinct from matter was a revolt against Cartesian dualism"
(Miller, 1982: 4). Very prominent in Mead's theory is also the
pragmatist idea that mind cannot be separated from action. There
can be no self apart from social action and mind, belief, and
knowledge are all related to conduct. Miller sees also as one of
the merits of Mead's theory that it showed how the manipulation of
objects by the hand is functionally related to reason or to
reflective intelligence (Miller, 1982: 5). But this is, of course,
one of the central tenets of historical materialism. In his account
of phylogenesis Engels gave a central role to the manipulation of
objects by the hand. The human mind arises out of this manipulation
of objects by the hand. To put it simply: humans cannot learn or
develop by just contemplating the surrounding world. The actions
upon the world and the consequent feedback play a central role in
the development of the human brain (see Engels, 1955). This is also
the view Vygotskij endorsed in his cultural-historical theory (see
Van IJzendoorn & Van der Veer, 1984).
So where are we now? We have shown several striking similari-
ties between the ideas of Mead and some of Vygotskij's ideas. We
know that Vygotskij's ideas originate in the dialectical tradition,
starting with Hegel. We also know that both Mead and Vygotskij
studied Hegel's philosophy. Can we track down some of the common
ideas to Hegel's writings? . Solomon (1983), in his fascinating
study of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, provides some insights,
which are of interest for our present purpose. Let us start with
Mead's and Vygotskij's concept of 'social interaction'. Solomon
makes it clear that this concept is a central one in Hegel's philo-
oophy. In the Phenomenology of Spirit the view is defended that
without interpersonal interaction there would be no 'self' and no
'self-consciousness' (Solomon, 1983: 430). Solomon goes on to
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explain the concept of social interaction by saying that, "we
cannot be self-conscious unless we are recognized. This argument
has been worked out in this century .. by George Herbert Mead and
some latter-day pragmatists in America" (Solomon, 1983: 438).
Solomon thus sees a clear connection between Hegel's philosophy and
Mead's ideas. Hegel also (as did Mead and Vygotskij) rejected the
'prisoner in a cell' view. To him the individual self was in no
sense immediately given, but a socially created concept. One cannot
have self-consciousness without the 'mediation' of other people, or
as Solomon puts it, "the self is no autonomous monad, which knows
itself immediately and the world only 'mediately'" (Solomon, 1983:
436). It is thus in Hegel's opinion absurd to believe that there is
an individual self prior to the interaction with other people. The
self is formed through the interaction with other people. It is
this (logical) thesis that Mead and Vygotskij transposed to the
domain of child development.
The emphasis on the interaction with other people is in
Hegel's philosophy connected with the view of active individuals.
For Hegel subjects are constantly active, striving for knowledge,
success etc. Solomon (1983: 385-401) devotes a whole selection of
his book to, what he calls, Hegels 'pragmatic turn'. For Hegel, to
know was also to be engaged in an activity. "This thesis ... is at
the heart of Hegel, and it is the main point of ... much of the
'Phenomenology' ... the traditional epistemological picture of
detached consciousness trying to reach out or infer to a world
'outside' is not only philosophically inadequate because it leads
to scepticism; it is a practical absurdity. Knowing is a part of
living and doing ..." (Solomon, 1983: 317). This emphasis on the
active subject is, of course, very prominent in the work of Mead
and Vygotskij too, and it is a necessary emphasis if one supposes
that the individual self (-consciousness) arises in a more or less
symmetrical reciprocal interaction.
At this point the reader might be tempted to make the
following objection. It is not possible to trace some of Mead's
ideas to American pragmatism, thereby invalidating the thesis that
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r
Pragmatism
(James, Dewey)
•»Mead»
Dialectical materialism
(Marx, Engels)
•VygotskijJ
these ideas originated in Hegel's work? Our answer would be yes and
no. Yes: Mead was heavily influenced by pragmatist thinkers such as
James and Dewey. No: this does not invalidate our argument because
these pragmatists were (at least initially) influenced by Hegel
themselves. Solomon (1983: 176, 317, 391) has shown the similari-
ties between Hegel's philosophy and pragmatism, and mentions that
2)Dewey referred his work to Hegel . There thus seems to be both a
direct line of influence from Hegel to Mead and an indirect line.
Much the same goes for Vygotskij (see Van IJzendoorn & Van der
Veer, 1984: 35). We can present our findings in the following
diagram. |
|
Hegel
1 T
J
Diagram. Lines of influence from Hegel to Head and Vygotskij.
One caveat is in order here. We do not wish to suggest that
either Mead or Vygotskij accepted Hegel's philosophy as a whole.
This would clearly be absurd. Both were inspired by this work, but i
rejected the general idealistic framework.
Conclusions
We have shown how some of the central concepts of modern develop-
mental psychology have their origin in Hegel's philosophy. The I
concept of 'social interaction', the rejection of the 'prisoner in t
a cell' view, and the emphasis on the active subject, can all be *
found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Both George Herbert Mead
and Lev Semenovic Vygotskij were influenced by the ideas of the
German philosopher. In this way we have explained at least part of
the similarities between Mead's and Vygotskij's theories.
j
Researchers, such as Lock (1980), who refer to both theoretists
are, without realizing it, inspired by ideas that have the iame
origin.
Notes
1) A direct attempt to show that Mead took some ideas from Hegel
has been made by Markovâ (1982).
2) For further information regarding the relation between
L
Hegelianism and pragmatism see Ph.P. Wiener (ed.), Dictionary
of the history of ideas. Vol. Ill, New York: Charles
t Scribner's Sons (1973 p. 556).
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